Vali Nasr: How to squeeze Jihadi culture out of Pakistan?

• Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future."

In July 2007, Vali Nasr writing for Christian Sciennce Monitor said that Al Qaeda and the Taliban use Pakistani soil as a haven and training ground. Recent deals between the government and Pashtun tribes have in effect ceded the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. A big reason Al Qaeda's influence is growing, according to the NIE, is the operational capability it enjoys in Pakistan.

Democracy should be wel-comed, but it will change little. The last time there was a transfer of power to a civilian government, in 1988, the military still chose the foreign minister and informed the prime minister that it would control the nuclear program, intelligence, security, and policies toward Afghanistan and India. This time, too, the military will continue to call the shots – especially when it comes to Afghanistan.

Islamabad is happy to nab foreign jihadis when pressured by the West or ban extremist groups that get out of hand, but it has been reluctant to uproot the infrastructure of extremism.

Extremist groups proliferate and operate in the open. Musharraf finds them useful in convincing Washington and Pakistan's middle classes that the military is all that protects the country from a Taliban-like Islamic state.

Without Pakistani cooperation, NATO and the US will have to substantially increase their commitments to contain the Taliban. That cooperation will not be forthcoming until the US addresses Pakistani interests.

President Hamid Karzai's strong ties to Delhi and the mushrooming of Indian consulates across Afghanistan. The territory that they "owned" until 9/11, thanks to the Taliban, is now at best neutral and at worst the playground of their arch rival, India.

Washington can give Pakistan greater interest in Afghanistan's stability than it has now by encouraging Kabul to include Pakistan's allies and clients in government; and more important, to finally recognize its international border with Pakistan. Read more

Washington Post: General Musharraf is the problem

Gen. Musharraf Is the Problem

An end to Pakistan's political crisis is incompatible with his personal ambitions.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007; Page A16

LIKE MANY autocrats before him, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has confused his own fortunes with those of his country. Over the weekend he told a visiting U.S. envoy that only he could save Pakistan from terrorism and lead it toward democracy. In fact, the opposite is true: It is increasingly clear that Gen. Musharraf has become the foremost obstacle to ending Pakistan's state of emergency and revitalizing what has been a losing battle against Islamic extremists. The Bush administration, which has been trying to rescue Gen. Musharraf, needs to accept that Pakistan's rescue can begin only with his departure.

Every major step Gen. Musharraf has taken in the past two weeks has been aimed at preserving his hold on power, at the expense of his country. The state of emergency he declared did not facilitate the army's fight against extremists, as he claimed, but it allowed him to fire a dozen Supreme Court judges who were considering legal challenges to his highly manipulated "reelection" as president. Yesterday the new judges appointed by Gen. Musharraf dismissed most of the challenges; they are paving the way for him to remain president even as they destroy the nascent independence of the Pakistani judiciary.

Gen. Musharraf has sought to appease the Bush administration by announcing parliamentary elections for early January. But he has refused to lift the state of emergency and has suggested several times that he will hold the vote under de facto martial law. That would save Gen. Musharraf from the political and legal challenges that could flow from a restoration of the rule of law, since his actions after he suspended the constitution have been hugely unpopular and blatantly illegal. It could also allow him to control the results of the elections and prevent a strong showing by Pakistan's two largest secular political parties, which oppose him. But it would make a mockery of democracy and ruin the chance for Pakistan's moderate center -- its political parties, jurists, journalists and civil society groups -- to unite with the army against the growing threat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The Bush administration, which for years has made the mistake of wedding itself to Gen. Musharraf rather than working to strengthen the country's secular institutions, at last is backing away slightly. President Bush telephoned the general to ask that he step down as army chief . Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte said after meeting Gen. Musharraf on Saturday that "emergency rule is not compatible with free, fair and credible elections." Mr. Negroponte also met with Gen. Musharraf's likely military successor, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, a pro-Western moderate. But the Bush administration is still clinging to the idea that Gen. Musharraf can be induced to make a deal with opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, though she has said publicly that she will no longer work with him.

In reality, it is difficult to imagine a positive outcome to Pakistan's crisis that does not involve Gen. Musharraf's retirement. The country's best interest, and that of the United States, lies in restoring the constitution, reinstating and strengthening an independent judiciary, reopening independent media without restrictions, and holding free and fair elections in which all Pakistani parties are able to participate. As Gen. Musharraf himself has recognized, he cannot survive in office under those conditions. editorial link

Balochistan Conflict: Solutions suggested by ICG

International Crisis Group (ICG) is a think tank which has been doing serious research on Pakistan. Their office in Islamabad has come out with excellent reports analysing the problems and suggesting solutions.

ICG recent report of Balochistan conflict concludes that although the crisis in Balochistan is assuming threatening dimensions, it is not irremediable provided the national and provincial elections are free and fair.

The restoration of participatory representative institutions would reduce tensions between the centre and the province, empower moderate forces and marginalise extremists. In the absence of a transition to meaningful democracy, however, the military’s strong-arm tactics are bound to further fuel the insurgency, at great cost to the Baloch people and Pakistan’s enfeebled federal framework.

ICG takes a detailed look at political alienation of people of Balochistan and growing frustration among the youth which is pushing them to join armed resistance against the centre.

Nationalist Balochis could be a natural partner against the extremist but myopic policies of government of Pakistan is alienating them.

report overview click here

full report

Other good resources:

Selig Harrison on political settlement with Baloch and Sindhi nationalists click here

Extremism and Pakistan's Education system?

Christian Fair (her work), Senior research associate at USIP, looks at the connections between Pakistan’s religious schools (madaris) and militancy in Pakistan.

She writes that contrary to popular belief, madrasah students are not all poor and madaris are not categorically tied to militancy. Madaris—along with mosques and public proselytizing events (tabligh)—are, however, “gathering” places where militant groups, religious ideologues, and potential recruits can interact. Religious leaders of some madaris issue edicts (fatwas) that justify the use of violence, and a small number of madaris are used for militant training. Limited evidence suggests that madrasah students more strongly support jihad than those of public or private schools—but public school students, who comprise 70% of Pakistan’s enrolled students, also have high levels of support for violence.

She rightly concludes that Pakistan’s entire education system requires comprehensive reform; such reform may be beyond Pakistan’s capability and there may be only limited scope for the United States to help. Increased participation by multinational organizations and demand for accountability by all partners are required to complete this daunting task. The costs of failure
are too high to countenance.

She further adds, Madaris merit continual observation as they may contribute both to the demand for terrorism and to the limited supply of militants. For the same reasons, Pakistan’s public school sector deserves much more attention than it currently enjoys. full report

Musharraf, Benazir & Extremists: What Do they seek?

Sept 20, 2007 - CSIS- Vikram Gupta and Teresita C Schaffer, analyses the political situation in Pakistan. General Musharraf faces 3 challenges: new energised judiciary backed by vibrant civil society, Nawaz & Benazir and finally extremists breaking the law and directly attacking army.

Musharraf basic constituency is Pakistan army.

Judiciary: President election on Oct6 and then Parliament election before 15 Jan 2008. President if elected from the (out going) parliament that was elected in 2002, many Pakistanis think, will be against the spirit of the constitution.

Political Parties: Musharraf is seeking 3 things: Benazir to at least give tacit support, maximize Presidential powers and retain control of army at least till he is elected as President. Benazir is seeking 4 things: corruption cases withdrawn, Musharraf retire from army before being elected as President, eligibility to run again as Prime minister that means a legislation allowing a third term and repeal of 58 (2b) so President cannot dissolve parliament. Musharraf is OK with withdrawing corruption cases but not with the last 2 demands. Nawaz wants to return to Pakistan and start a movement to oust Musharraf.

Dawn report Oct 5, 2007 - Military and Benazir "power sharing deal".

Report blames MQM for May 12 violence in Karachi that left 40 people dead. MQM thuggish track record hurts Musharraf more than their capacity to mobilise people. MQM opposes any deal with Benazir as PPP is their rival in Sindh.

3 factors could trigger to impose a State of Emergency: court disallowing Musharraf to run for President, major trouble in the streets and political parties resigning such that quorum or moral legitimacy is absent from Presidential election.

Looking into sources of extremism authors asks a pertinent question that who controls tribal area (FATA)? . 2 groups are sources of extremist violence, one that sees Pakistan government efforts to integrate the areas into Pakistan. The other group is the one who are challenging the army and law enforcement. These are the perpetrators of suicide attack on military and those that want to establish themselves as Islamic oriented power.

full report

Govt minister confirms that cases againt Benazir to be dropped. Daily time 2 Oct 2007

Talibanization of Pakistan Tribal Agencies.

Hassan Abaas (his other article), author of Pakistan: drifting into extremism, writes that taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province).

Pakistan will predictably revert to "peace deals" in the short-term, leading to a lowering of the number of military checkpoints in the area.

Hassan further explains that the factors that "limit" Pakistan's effective clampdown on all things Taliban in FATA remain linked to its fear about increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan if the Taliban are comprehensively defeated, and the lack of Pakistani public support for anything that appears to be done in pursuance of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.

Hassan looks at all 7 tribal agencies (Map of FATA) that form FATA. He writes that Bajaur Agency is considered a stronghold of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) units, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) has representation in parliament from Bajaur (Daily Times, February 13, 2006).

He explains that Taliban, in order to show their control, have been successful in enforcing, in some agencies, following things:

1. Friday as the weekly holiday
2. Taliban-sponsored rumor that the Pakistani government-run polio vaccination drive was a U.S. plot to sterilize Muslim children
3. binding on all men of the agency to wear caps.
4. banning music
5. warned tailors to strictly observe religious codes while sewing clothes for men and women

Furthermore, Pakistan has been rattled by 39 suicide attacks in 2007, so far killing around 350 people, and most of these attacks targeted the Pakistani army, the Frontier Corps and government officials in FATA and the NWFP.

Indeed, Musharraf's capacity to respond militarily is curtailed because of political compulsions. For Afghanistan and the United States, this means a troublesome scenario. Pakistan's return to democracy may potentially change things for the better, but Musharraf's move in this direction is sluggish and uncertain. Full Report

Hassan Abbas Blog (click here)

CSIS South Asia Program Director supports fair election

CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director, South Asia program, Teresita Schaffer, wrote a bold and an honest piece titled "Not the same Pakistan"

She reminded that US priorities are Pakistan's energetic participation in anti-terrorism operations and its political support in stabilizing Afghanistan.

She makes a strong case that US should make clear publicly that they will work with anyone who can win a genuinely free election and who will fight against the terrorists and lawbreakers that threaten Pakistan's society. (Full Publication in PDF - Click here)

For other publication by Teresita Schaffer (Click here)

Financial Times editorial writes on the same line saying that Pakistan needs to restore the legitimacy of its rulers and credibility of its institutions. A Musharraf-Bhutto alliance will not do that. An open contest, leading to a new democratic consensus against extremism, just might. (Full Editorial)